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The present paper explores the eﬀect of trade liberalization on the
level of productivity as well as the rate of productivity growth in an R&D-
based model with heterogeneous ﬁrms. We introduce new and plausible
features that are absent in existing studies. First, technical progress
takes the form of continual quality improvement of products over time.
Second, ﬁrm entry and exit are endogenously determined due to creative
destruction of products traded. In this framework, we demonstrate that
a lower transport cost or export sunk cost unambiguously reallocates
resources from non-exporting industries to R&D as well as exporting
industries. This means that trade liberalization increases the level of
manufacturing productivity and the rate of technical progress. These
results are found to be robust in an extended model with population
growth without scale eﬀects. In extensions of the basic model, we also
endogenize the ex ante distribution of ﬁrm heterogeneity and examine
the eﬀect of R&D subsidies.
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1 Introduction
Since the late 1990s, many empirical studies provide evidence regarding the mi-
croeconomic aspects of exporting ﬁrms (e.g. Bernard, Jensen, and Lawrence
(1995) and Tybout (2003)). These ﬁrms are found to be bigger in employ-
ment, more skill- and capital-intensive, more productive and grow faster. To
explain for those characteristics, ﬁrm heterogeneity is introduced into tradi-
tional models of trade. Pioneering studies are Eaton and Kortum (2002),
Bernard, Jensen, and Kortum (2003) and Melitz (2003). However, those mod-
els are essentially static in nature. Therefore, although they are able to answer
questions on changes in the level of productivity due to freer trade, they are not
suitable to answer “dynamic” questions on changes in the rate of productiv-
ity growth. Insights on the latter issue are clearly important, given empirical
evidence showing that exporting ﬁrms grow faster than non-exporters (e.g.
Bernard and Jensen, 1999) and that trade and economic growth are positively
correlated (e.g. Wacziarg and Welch, 2008). It is also imperative to inform pol-
icy makers of the growth eﬀect of trade liberalization on the basis of rigorous
theoretical reasoning.
The ﬁrst objective of the present study is to ﬁll this gap by developing
an R&D-based model of international trade with heterogeneous ﬁrms. In
the model, productivity growth is driven by endogenous technical progress
in the form of continual quality improvement of products over time. This
quality-ladder approach departs from existing studies, and the present paper
represents the ﬁrst attempt to introduce a quality-ladder model into the lit-
erature on trade with heterogeneous ﬁrms.1 Closest to the present paper are
Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud (2008) and Gustafsson and Segerstrom (2007),
who develop R&D-based models of trade with heterogeneous ﬁrm. However,
their studies are based on the variety expansion approach, pioneered by Melitz
(2003).
The second objective of our paper is to generate new insights on the growth
eﬀect of trade liberalization in a model with heterogeneous ﬁrms. Baldwin and
Robert-Nicoud (2008) demonstrate that freer trade encourages or discourages
long-run growth, depending upon the structure of knowledge assumed. The
model is extended in Gustafsson and Segerstrom (2007) by introducing pop-
1Quality-ladder models of growth are also called Shumpeterian growth models. See
Segerstrom, Anant, and Dinopoulos (1990), Grossman and Helpman (1991) and Aghion
and Howitt (1992) for early contributions.
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ulation growth. They establish that globalization boosts productivity growth
if the strength of knowledge spillovers is weak enough, but otherwise, produc-
tivity growth falls. Indeed, it seems diﬃcult to reconcile their mixed results
with many empirical studies which consistently show a positive relationship
between trade and growth.2 In addition, the “semi-endogenous” growth model
of Gustafsson and Segerstrom (2007) also shows that trade liberalization does
not aﬀect the share of workers devoted to R&D in total working population.3
It means that R&D incentives are independent of trade liberalization in the
long run.
We re-examine those mixed results, using the quality-ladder framework of
technical progress. More speciﬁcally, we will demonstrate that trade liberal-
ization (i) reallocates resources from non-exporting industries to R&D as well
as exporting industries, and (ii) unambiguously promotes technical progress
in contrast with the above studies. We also derive conditions for a monotonic
increase in welfare of trading economies (e.g., a suﬃciently large market size)
as they become more open to international trade. Those key results are found
to be robust in an extended model incorporating population growth.
Turning to the description of the model, we consider two identical open
economies, competing in the world market with transportation costs. We as-
sume that the introduction of higher quality goods requires costly R&D, in ad-
dition to sunk costs for implementing innovation (or equivalently interpreted
as entry cost into the domestic market) and beachhead costs for exporting.
Manufacturing productivity is randomly drawn from a given ex ante probabil-
ity distribution, as in Melitz (2003). A suﬃciently advanced innovation, which
results in a suﬃciently low marginal cost of production along with a higher
quality, enables entrepreneurs to capture monopoly rents in the foreign market
as well as the domestic market. On the other hand, a less-advanced innova-
tion only enables entrepreneurs to capture the domestic monopoly rents. A
least-advanced innovation that results in a higher marginal cost than a cut-oﬀ
level forces entrepreneurs to give up on implementation of innovation. After
each innovation and subsequent implementation, product quality is improved,
2See Wacziarg and Welch (2008) for one of the latest studies on this issue. Indeed,
Rodrik and Rodr´ ıguez (2000) point out the lack of credible evidence on a systematic negative
correlation between openness and growth. Alesina, Spolaore, and Wacziarg (2005, p.1515)
call it “a huge achievement” in the empirical literature.
3In semi-endogenous growth models, the rate of technical progress is pinned down by
population growth in the long run, but the resource allocation to R&D is still endogenously
determined. See Jones (2003) for a survey.
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driving productivity growth in the long run.
Our model with quality improvement possesses several interesting features
worth mention. First, in the literature, the exit of ﬁrms from the market
in variety-based models is assumed to be an exogenous process. That is, no
reason is given for why ﬁrms go out of business. In our model, in contrast, ﬁrm
exits are endogenously determined, as quality improvement of a given product
causes existing products obsolete. That is, ﬁrms exit form the market due to
creative destruction caused by technical progress.
Second, quality improvement enables innovators to leapfrog incumbent
ﬁrms. Because of this feature, the direction of trade in a given industry is
reversed whenever innovation results in exportable products. This feature is
consistent with the observation that innovation determines comparative ad-
vantage of products (e.g. cars and computers) and aﬀects the direction of
trade. In contrast, in variety-based models, the direction of trade of a given
product remains unchanged until the ﬁrm exits from the market for an exoge-
nous reason.
Third, in trade models with heterogeneous ﬁrms, a given industry can be
open or closed to international trade due to export sunk costs. In addition
to this feature, in our model, the state of a given industry (i.e. open or
closed to trade) dynamically changes due to continual innovation in the world
market. This arises because the state-of-the-art products may not be exported,
in which case lower-quality goods are consumed in the non-innovating country.
In this sense, there is asymmetry in terms of quality levels consumed in the
two economies, although they are structurally symmetric.
The key result of our study concerns the eﬀect of trade liberalization on
the level of manufacturing productivity and the rate of technical progress. A
lower transport cost or export cost is shown to induce ineﬃcient ﬁrms to exit
from the market. As a result, exporting industries expand and manufactur-
ing productivity rises in consistent with many empirical studies. Regarding
innovative activities, trade liberalization unambiguously reallocates resources
to R&D, accelerating the rate of technical progress. The reason can be under-
stood by identifying two channels that work to bring about this pro-growth re-
sult. First, trade liberalization, which expands exporting industries, increases
ex ante sunk costs for developing a proﬁtable product which includes costs
for exporting. Resources are diverted from R&D through this sunk cost chan-
nel, discouraging R&D. Second, trade liberalization allows monopoly ﬁrms to
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raise the price-cost margin in the foreign market. Proﬁts increase through
this monopoly markup channel, boosting R&D incentives. In equilibrium, the
monopoly markup channel always dominates the sunk cost channel, giving
rise to our key result. In contrast, in Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud (2008), the
monopoly markup channel disappears in equilibrium due to the CES produc-
tion function used to model variety expansion. Through the remaining sunk
cost channel, trade liberalization encourages or discourages technical progress,
depending upon the structure of knowledge assumed. The same reason applies
for the result of Gustafsson and Segerstrom (2007) that the share of workers
devoted to R&D is unaﬀected by trade liberalization.
Robustness of these key results are checked by extending the basic model
to incorporate population growth. We show that the proportion of workers
devoted to R&D in total population increases due to globalization. In this
sense, our key results established in the basic model with a constant population
still hold in an arguably more plausible setting with population growth and
without scale eﬀects.
In existing trade models with heterogeneous ﬁrms, productivity is ran-
domly drawn from a given ex ante distribution, and the ex post distribution
of ﬁrm productivity is determined in equilibrium. We show how the ex ante
distribution of ﬁrm productivity can be endogenized in an extended model.
Our result indicates that an increase in manufacturing productivity is realized
through the ex post distribution rather than changes in the ex ante distribu-
tion of ﬁrm heterogeneity. The issue is related to validity of the widely used
assumption that the ex ante distribution is exogenously given.
We also investigate the policy impact of an R&D subsidy. The policy is
shown to force ineﬃcient ﬁrms to exit from both the domestic and foreign
markets. That is, the subsidy increases the average productivity of operating
ﬁrms, but it does not necessarily promote export. On the other hand, it is
not clear whether R&D is promoted. This is partly because the policy makes
it less likely that a given innovation is implemented, adversely aﬀecting R&D
incentives.
Product quality is often found to be important in the understanding of
trade patterns. For example, recent studies emphasize product quality in
explaining for price diﬀerences across countries. Richer countries are also found
to export and import higher-quality products (e.g. Schott (2004), Hummels
and Klenow (2005) and Hallak (2006)). For example, Baldwin and Harrigan
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(2007) introduce product quality into a model a l´ a Melitz (2003). Other studies
include Hallak and Sivadasan (2006), Helble and Okubo (2006) and Gervais
(2008). Those models, however, are essentially static in nature and the level
of quality is ﬁxed in equilibrium. In our model, on the other hand, the quality
of products improves over time due to costly innovative activities, and it is the
source of productivity growth in the long run.
In terms of investment in innovative activity in an open economy frame-
work, Atkeson and Burstein (2006) is closely related to our study. In their
model, ﬁrms invest in cost reduction after entry until they exit for exogenous
reasons. The authors examine the eﬀect of freer trade on process innovation
after market entry. On the other hand, the present study focuses on incentives
for product innovation before ﬁrms enter the market. In addition, we analyti-
cally solve the model, whereas quantitative simulation is used in Atkeson and
Burstein (2006).
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 develops the basic
model where quality improvement drives growth in the presence of heteroge-
neous ﬁrms. Steady state equilibrium is characterized in Section 3, and Section
4 analyzes the eﬀect of trade liberalization on the distribution of ﬁrm produc-
tivity and technical progress. Section 5 introduces population growth in order
to check the robustness of key results. It is followed by discussion on key dif-
ferences between the present model and closely related studies in Section 6.
In Section 7, we endogenize the ex ante distribution of ﬁrm heterogeneity, and
the impact of R&D subsidies is also considered. Final remarks are given in
Section 8.
2 The Basic Model Setup
2.1 Consumers
There are two identical economies, indexed by 1 and 2. The country index
is suppressed unless otherwise ambiguity arises. In each economy, there are
two production sectors, manufacturing and R&D with L number of workers.
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where ρ is the subjective rate of time preference and Y denotes consumption
of ﬁnal output. Dynamic utility maximization requires
˙ Et
Et
= rt − ρ (2)
where r is the rate of interest and E denotes consumption expenditure.
2.2 Production Technology
2.2.1 Final Output
Final output is produced under perfect competition by assembling a range







, λ > 1, kit = 0,1,2... (3)
where yi denotes the quantity of intermediate goods i, and λki represents the
quality level of the products. Given the Cobb-Douglas technology, the demand





where E = PY , P is the price of ﬁnal output and pi is the price of yi.
2.2.2 Intermediate Goods
Intermediate goods are produced, using labor only. We normalize the wage
rate to one and assume that each intermediate good is produced by ﬁrms with
marginal cost
a(c) = cL + c, 0 < cL < ∞. (5)
In addition, c is a random variable drawn from the distribution function
Z (c), c ∈ (0,cH), 0 < cH < ∞. (6)
Intermediate goods are diﬀerentiated in quality within each industry. To
become a monopoly, ﬁrms must ﬁrst succeed in R&D to create a blueprint for
the state-of-the-art products. The true value of c is revealed only after ﬁrms
6Trade and Firm Heterogeneity Haruyama and Zhao
succeed in R&D.
In addition, there is an iceberg trade cost: τ > 1 units of goods must be
shipped in order for 1 unit to arrive in a foreign country. This means that the
“eﬀective” marginal cost of exported goods in the foreign market is τa(c).
2.3 Price and Proﬁts
Product quality improvement is the engine of growth in our model. Each
innovation generates a blueprint for the product whose quality is higher than
the state-of-the-art in the industry by a factor λ, irrespective of whether it
occurs in country 1 or 2. That is, successful R&D ﬁrms always leapfrog the
incumbent ﬁrm in quality.
Furthermore, we assume technology diﬀusion within an economy and be-
tween the two countries. Speciﬁcally, the second-highest quality goods can be
competitively produced in any country with marginal cost cL.4 This means
that the technological gap between two countries in a given industry, which are
deﬁned as |ki1 − ki2|, is one at most.5 An important consequence of such tech-
nological diﬀusion is that ﬁrms producing the top-quality goods always face
price competition from competitive producers of the second-highest quality
goods.
Because of this feature, ﬁrm’s pricing behaviors are the same in all indus-
tries in the domestic and foreign markets. Since the price elasticity of demand
is one, monopoly ﬁrms set the price of the state-of-the-art products at cLλ,
given that marginal cost of lower quality goods is cL.
Firms that succeed in R&D can be grouped into three types, depending
on the realized value of c. First, if c is too high, ﬁrms do not enter the market
due to the presence of sunk costs required to implement innovation. Second, if








Third, for suﬃciently low values of c, ﬁrms can serve both the domestic and
foreign markets after paying a beachhead cost. It earns π (c) in the domestic
4One could imagine a situation in which patents expire in the world market once higher-
quality goods are created. In this case, the top-quality goods only are protected by patents.
5The same assumption is used in Aghion, Bloom, Blundell, Griﬃth, and Howitt (2005)
in a diﬀerent context.









in the foreign market. Proﬁts increase in the size of innovation λ, but decrease
in the transport cost τ.
2.4 Entry Decisions
To enter the market, ﬁrms must incur two or three kinds of sunk costs, de-
pending on ﬁrm types. First, R&D costs to create a blueprint for higher
quality goods are required. R&D costs are sunk in the sense that it cannot
be recovered, even if ﬁrms decide to exit. Note that marginal cost c is un-
known during an R&D race. The true value of c becomes observable once
ﬁrms succeed in R&D. Second, ﬁrms must also incur sunk costs f to imple-
ment the newly invented technology. Implementation costs are equivalently
interpreted as costs of entry into the domestic market. Those costs must be
incurred regardless of whether or not ﬁrms export their goods. Third, if ﬁrms
decide to export their products, they must incur export costs fx, which are
additional sunk costs for exporters (i.e., beachhead costs).
To describe ﬁrm behaviors, consider ﬁrst domestic ﬁrms. The present dis-
counted values of proﬁts in the domestic market (7) and in the foreign market
(8) are denoted by v (c) and vx (c), respectively. Firms pay implementation
costs if vt (c) ≥ f, and become a monopoly in the domestic market, replacing
the incumbent. However, if vt (c) < f, ﬁrms do not enter, and the incumbent
remains in the domestic market. In this case, even though new knowledge (a
blueprint of higher quality goods) is invented, it is not implemented and the
new good is not produced. We assume that the realized value of c is speciﬁc
to the knowledge created and the industry to which it is applied, hence no
other ﬁrms would ﬁnd it proﬁtable to produce the good. The cut-oﬀ value of
c, denoted by C, at which ﬁrms are indiﬀerent between paying and not paying
implementation costs is deﬁned by
vt (C) = f, 0 < C ≤ cH. (9)
Firms implement innovation for c ≤ C, and not otherwise. Note that the
implementation decision is a stable process because
∂π (c)
∂c
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Next, consider exporting ﬁrms, which earn proﬁts (7) and (8) in the do-
mestic and foreign markets, respectively. Similar reasonings used above apply
here. Firms export their goods if the value of c is such that vx (c) ≥ fx, but
not otherwise. Therefore, the cut-oﬀ value of c, denoted by Cx, is deﬁned by
vx (Cx) = fx, 0 < Cx ≤ cH. (10)
Firms export their products if c ≤ Cx, and not otherwise. Note that the
realized value of c is diﬀerent across industries, though the cut-oﬀ values C
and Cx are the same in all industries.
2.5 R&D Investment
The true value of c is unobservable during an R&D race. We use Vt to denote
the ex ante value of innovation, which ﬁrms expect to achieve if they succeed




, fr > 0, (11)
when R workers are used. Therefore, research ﬁrms choose the optimal number
of R&D workers by solving
max
Rt
VtIt − (1 − s)Rt (12)
where s is the rate of R&D subsidy. The ﬁrst order condition is
Vt = (1 − s)fr. (13)
2.6 Industry Dynamics
Since the two countries are assumed to be structurally identical, a half of goods
are produced in country 1, and the other half are produced in country 2. In
addition, industries can be grouped into two types, depending on whether or
not the state-of-the-art products are traded. They are termed type-A and
type-B industries with key features summarized in Table 1.
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in the innovating country,
and the 2nd highest
quality in the other
Table 1: Types of industries.
Column A identiﬁes industries in which ﬁrms produce the state-of-the-art
products which are exported to the foreign country. The measure of such
industries is denoted by NA. Type-A industries are open to trade. This
situation arises when innovation occurs with marginal cost being suﬃciently
small so that 0 ≤ c ≤ Cx.
In column B, ﬁrms produce the top-quality goods, which are not exported
because marginal costs is not suﬃciently low, i.e., Cx < c ≤ C. Therefore, the
state-of-the-art products are consumed in the country where innovation take
place, but not in the other country. On the other hand, because of technology
diﬀusion, products consumed in the non-innovating country are second-highest
in quality on the product line and competitively produced.
Given that the measure of industries is one, we have
1 = NA + NB. (14)
Although this equation must hold at each moment of time, the type of a
particular industry continually changes as innovation occurs either in country
1 or 2. That is, trade patterns in a given industry change as innovations occur.
Such changes in industry types are described in Figure 1.
To explain for the meaning of arrows in the ﬁgure, consider an industry of
type-A. If innovation takes place in either country with 1 ≤ c ≤ Cx, the state-
of-the-art products are still exported, and industry type does not change. In
this case, the industry stays in the NA group in the ﬁgure. However, suppose
that innovation occurs with Cx < c ≤ C in either country. Since c is in
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the middle range, an innovating ﬁrm implements its latest technology and
produces the state-of-the-art products for the domestic market only. That
is, the industry moves from type-A to type-B, and this is represented by
the rightward arrow. Since this transition occurs with the Poisson rate of
[Z (C) − Z (Cx)](2I), the number of type-A industries switching to type-B
industries during an inﬁnitesimal time period dt is NA [Z (C) − Z (Cx)](2I).
Next, consider an industry of type-B. Innovation with Cx < c ≤ C in
either country does not change the type of industry, since an innovating ﬁrm
does not export their top-quality products. In this case, the second-highest
quality goods are competitively produced and consumed in an non-innovating
country. On the other hand, innovation with 0 ≤ c ≤ Cx in either country
moves the industry to type-A from type-B. The state-of-the-art products are
consumed in both countries thanks to exporting. This case is captured by the
leftward arrow in Figure 1. The term attached to the arrow shows the number
of industries moving to group A from group B during a small time interval dt.
In summary, not all countries can consume the highest quality products due
to ﬁxed costs of exporting. Only the state-of-the-art products with marginal
cost below the cutoﬀ level (Cx) are consumed in all countries.
Given the above discussion, the measure of type-A industries change ac-
cording to
˙ NAt = NBtZ (Cx)(2It) − NAt [Z (C) − Z (Cx)](2It). (15)
This equation implies that the direction of changes in NA is determined by C,
Cx and NA, and independent of the arrival rate of innovation I.
2.7 Value of Firms and Innovation
Recall that v (c) and vx (c) denote the expected present values of ﬂow proﬁts
π (c) and πx (c), respectively. Firms with successful innovation gain v (c) in the
domestic market. However, the value of v (c) drops to zero if innovation with
0 ≤ c ≤ C occurs in either country. It is either because the second-highest
quality goods are no longer demanded or because they are competitively pro-
duced. Therefore, vt (c) is deﬁned by the following asset equation
rtvt (c) = πt (c) + ˙ vt (c) − Z (C)(2It)vt (c). (16)
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vx (c), which ﬁrms with successful innovation gain in the foreign market, is
similarly deﬁned by
rtvxt (c) = πxt (c) + ˙ vxt (c) − Z (C)(2It)vxt (c). (17)
Note that v (c) and vx (c) are ex post values in the sense that they are
conditional on the realized value of c. Moreover, implementation costs must
be incurred to obtain vt (c), and export costs must be sunk to gain vx (c).





[v (c) − f]dZ (c) +
Z Cx
0
[vx (c) − fx]dZ (c). (18)
The ﬁrst term represents expected net gains from domestic sales, and the
second term captures additional gains from exports.
2.8 Labor Market Condition
Workers are used for four purposes: R&D, implementation of innovation, sunk
costs for export and manufacturing. Given the measure of industries being one,
the total number of R&D workers in a country is R.
During a small time interval, Z (C)I is equivalent to the number of in-
dustries where R&D succeeds and innovation is implemented simultaneously.
Since f workers are used for implementation in each industry, fZ (C)I gives
the total number of workers used for innovation implementation. Similarly,
the total number of workers used for export sunk costs is fxZ (Cx)I.
Turning to the manufacturing sector, ﬁrst consider type-B industries, in
which there are two sorts of ﬁrms. In one half of the industries, the domestic
market is served with the state-of-the-art products, which are produced by
local monopoly ﬁrms, but not exported. Thus, the labor demand of each of
those manufacturing ﬁrms is Ea(c)/cLλ, and the total labor demand of those










Z (C) − Z (Cx)
. (19)
In the other half of type-B industries, the second-highest quality goods are
competitively produced with marginal cost being cL. Therefore, the labor
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Turning to type-A industries, ﬁrms in one half of the industries serve the
domestic market with the state-of-the-art products and also export them to the
foreign country. In the other half of the industries, the top-quality products are
imported from abroad. Therefore, we only need to consider the half of type-A
industries where domestic ﬁrms operate. Given the price of goods being cLλ,












On the other hand, the marginal cost of producing exported goods is τa(c),
taking the transport cost into account. Therefore, the labor demand arising
from foreign sales is
τℓA. (22)
Then, the full employment condition in the labor market in an economy is
L = Rt + fZ (C)It + fxZ (Cx)It + ℓt (23)
where ℓ ≡ NB
2 cLEt+ℓB+(1 + τ)ℓA is the total labor demand in manufacturing.
3 Steady State Equilibrium
3.1 Four Equilibrium Conditions
















ρ + 2Z (C)R/fr
(24)
where r = ρ is also used. The right-hand sides of those equations deﬁne
the expected present values of proﬁts in the domestic and foreign markets
when marginal costs take the threshold values C and Cx, respectively. Those
conditions determine C and Cx, ceteris paribus. In this sense, (24) captures
ﬁrms’ decisions on implementation of innovation and entry into the foreign
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market.
The third equilibrium condition is related to ﬁrms’ R&D decisions. The
ex ante value of innovation during an R&D race is given by (18). In addition,
free entry in R&D activity is captured by (13). Then, using those equations
along with (13), (16), (17) and (18), one can derive the following condition:
Λ(C,Cx;τ)E
ρ + 2Z (C)R/fr
= ˜ F (C,Cx;fx,s) (25)
where
˜ F (C,Cx;fx,s) ≡
(1 − s)fr
Z (C)




























(25) is the R&D incentive condition. Its left-hand side is the ex ante value of
innovation, conditional on innovation being implementable. Its right-hand side
is interpreted as the ex ante ﬁxed costs of developing a proﬁtable product. The
ﬁrst term of (26) is the average R&D costs incurred until R&D succeeds. The
second term is the cost of implementation of innovation, and the third term
is the expected cost of entry into the foreign market, given that innovation
is implementable. Turning to (27), it is interpreted as the expected rate of
monopoly markup over marginal cost, given that innovation is implementable.
Its ﬁrst and second terms concern the markup rate in the domestic and foreign
markets, respectively. Note that Z (Cx)/Z (C) is the probability that products
based on implementable innovation are exported.
The ﬁnal equilibrium condition is based on the full-employment condition
(23). To derive it, note that the number of industries of each type in steady






Z (C) − Z (Cx)
Z (C)
. (28)
Condition (15) also shows that (28) is stable, given Z (Cx) < Z (C) and 1 >
NA > 0.6 A convenient feature is that NA and NB depend on C and Cx
6Consider NA = 0. In this case, ˙ NA > 0. On the other hand, we have ˙ NA < 0 for NA = 1,
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only, which in turn means that C and Cx must be constant in steady state.
Note that NA is equivalent to the probability that a newly invented product
is exported, given that innovation is implementable. It is also useful to note
that if the export cost fx is so large that Cx = 0, then there is no exporting
industry, i.e. NA = 0, and all industries are of type-B. This case is equivalent
to a closed economy, but with knowledge diﬀusion between countries.
Given (28), Appendix A shows that the total labor demand in manufac-
turing is given by




The second term on the right-hand side is equivalent to total proﬁts earned by
ﬁrms in the economy. Indeed, Λ(C,Cx;τ)E is aggregate proﬁts in the world,
and a half of them accrues to ﬁrms based in one economy. Using (26) and



















Note that F (C,Cx;fx) = ˜ F (C,Cx;fx,s) for s = 0. (24), (25) and (30) con-
stitute the system of four equations with four unknowns, C, Cx, R and E.
3.2 Determination of Productivity Growth
In our model, productivity growth occurs due to quality improvement of prod-
ucts. To derive the rate of technical progress, let us identify the global tech-
nological frontier by the index constructed on the basis of the state-of-the-art











˜ kit is the highest quality achieved in the world economy as a whole.
Note that the world technological frontier advances whenever innovation occurs
as long as c ≤ C. Therefore, the rate at which the world technological frontier
since Z (Cx) < Z (C).
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advances can be written as
g = (lnλ)Z (C)(2I). (33)
To understand this expression, note that each innovation improves the level
of product quality by a factor λ in each industry, and such innovation arrives
at the rate of Z (C)(2I). Note that g and C are positively related. It is
because technical progress depends on innovations which are implemented.
Innovations which are not implemented do not count. Due to this property, the
rate of quality improvement is inversely related to the level of manufacturing
productivity.
Let us turn to the rate of technical progress from the perspective of each
individual country. In general, the average level of quality of the products
available in a given country is lower than the world technological frontier, since
the second-highest quality products are competitively produced and consumed
domestically in a half of type-B industries. However, note that unlike the
world technological frontier, innovation raises the quality level of products by
a factor λ or λ2, depending on industry types. Because of this property, the
ratio of the average quality level in a given economy to the world technological
frontier is constant in equilibrium. Indeed, Appendix B shows that the rate
at which quality improves in each country is equivalent to (33).
4 Eﬀects of Trade Liberalization
In this section, we assume s = 0 (i.e. no R&D subsidy), as we are interested
in the eﬀect of trade liberalization. The eﬀect of the industrial policy will be
discussed in Section 7.2.
4.1 Manufacturing Productivity
Here, we consider the eﬀect of trade liberalization on the threshold levels of











We assume fx > f, which is consistent with empirical studies and ensures that
C > Cx in equilibrium. This equation deﬁnes the combination of C and Cx at
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which the threshold conditions (9) and (10) simultaneously hold. (34) shows
that C and Cx are positively related. The intuition is simple. The condition
basically determines the relative ex post values (i.e. after c is revealed) of the
two threshold ﬁrms with marginal costs C and Cx. A higher C reduces the
value of the ﬁrm indiﬀerent between serving the domestic market only and
shutting down. A constant relative proﬁtability is maintained with a lower
value of the ﬁrm indiﬀerent to export, which is realized via a higher Cx. For
later use, (34) is succinctly written as
Cx = Cx (C;τ,fx) or C = C (Cx;τ,fx). (35)
Substituting the ﬁrst equations of (24) and (35) into (25), the following
condition can be derived:





























D(C) is monotonically increasing in C, as depicted in Figure 2. Intuitively,
D(C) is equivalent to the ex ante value of innovation during an R&D race.
A higher C means that a given innovation becomes more likely to be imple-
mented. This raises the value of innovation. In Figure 2, the equilibrium value
of C is found at the intersection point between the D curve and a horizontal
line at fr.
We can conduct a similar analysis for the determination of Cx. Eliminate
Cx in the R&D incentive condition (25) by making use of the second equations
of (24) and (35) to obtain
fr = X (Cx;τ,fx) (38)





























Figure 2 depicts an upward sloping curve representing X (Cx). The intuition
for the positive slope is basically the same as in the case of D(C). That is,
a higher Cx makes products more likely to be exported, increasing the value
of innovation. The equilibrium value of Cx is given at the intersection point
between the X curve and the horizontal line at fr.
Having characterized the equilibrium, let us consider the eﬀects of trade
liberalization, which is captured by a lower transport cost τ and a lower beach-
head cost fx. It is straightforward to show that in response to a fall in either
parameter, the D curve unambiguously shifts up, decreasing C. On the other
hand, the X curve shifts down, increasing Cx. The result is summarized below:
Proposition 1. A lower transport cost τ or export cost fx decreases C and
increases Cx.
A higher Cx means that manufacturing ﬁrms are more likely to be ex-
porters. A lower C means that innovation is less likely to be implemented.
This means that entry into the domestic market becomes more diﬃcult and
that ineﬃcient ﬁrms are driven out of the market. In this sense, resources are
reallocated to exporting ﬁrms from non-exporting ones. It also means that the







increases. Another aspect of these changes is that exporting ﬁrms earn higher
proﬁts than before (see (8)). Indeed, the result of Proposition 1 is found in
the variety-expansion models of Melitz (2003), Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud
(2008) and Gustafsson and Segerstrom (2007). The contribution of our paper
is that the same result holds in the growth model of product quality improve-
ment, which has not been modelled in the literature on trade and growth with
heterogeneous ﬁrms.
An additional implication can be derived from Proposition 1. Since C falls
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and Cx rises due to trade liberalization, it should be clear that the measure
of type-A industries increases (see (28)). Therefore, the following result is
obvious:
Proposition 2. A lower τ or fx increases the measure of exporting industries,
and decreases the measure of industries which are closed to trade.
Proposition 1 implies that resources are reallocated to exporting industries
due to trade liberalization. In addition, Proposition 2 means that trade liber-
alization makes more industries open to international trade. These predictions
are consistent with many empirical results. For instance, Bernard, Jensen, and
Schott (2003) ﬁnd that low-productivity plants in U.S. manufacturing indus-
tries with falling trade costs are more likely to die. In a comprehensive survey
of empirical studies, Tybout (2003) concludes that the general consensus of
this literature is that foreign competition both reduces the domestic market
share of import-competing ﬁrms and reallocates domestic market share from
ineﬃcient to eﬃcient ﬁrms. More recently, Baldwin and Harrigan (2007) show
that trade does not take place in many industries and the incidence of what
they call “export zeros” is strongly correlated with distance, which is measured
by the transport cost in the present model.
4.2 R&D and Technical Progress
One of the main issues that the present paper tackles concerns the eﬀects of
globalization on R&D incentives in the presence of heterogeneous ﬁrms. To

















This is the key equation of the present study. It determines the equilibrium
number of R&D workers, given C and Cx. Using (41), we can establish the
following proposition:
Proposition 3. A lower transport cost τ or export cost fx increases the num-
ber of R&D workers employed.
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due to (43) and (45). ￿
Trade liberalization unambiguously increases R&D workers. That is, re-
sources are reallocated from manufacturing to R&D. To develop an intuition
for the result, consider the transport cost. There are three eﬀects that we can
distinguish, and we consider each of them in turn. First, the direct eﬀect of
a lower τ works though Λ(C,Cx;τ), which is the expected rate of monopoly
price markup over marginal cost. Since the transport cost enters as part of
“eﬀective” marginal cost, a fall in τ unambiguously increases the markup,
boosting R&D incentives.
Second, the expected price markup Λ(C,Cx;τ) is also aﬀected by τ in-
directly via changes in the threshold marginal costs C and Cx. Proposition
1 shows that a lower transport cost increases Cx, which leads to an increase
in the expected monopoly markup (see (27)). On the other hand, a lower C,
caused by a lower transport cost, decreases the markup. Although these indi-
rect eﬀects work in opposite directions, the monopoly markup unambiguously
increases as τ falls if its direct and indirect eﬀects are combined together (see
(43)).
Third, a lower transport cost aﬀects F (C,Cx), which is the ex ante ﬁxed
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costs of developing a proﬁtable product, via the threshold marginal costs C
and Cx. A fall in C due to a lower τ makes it less likely for innovation to be
implemented. This increases ex ante R&D costs (fr/Z (C)) and the expected
number of workers used as export costs (fxZ (Cx)/Z (C)). In addition, a
higher Cx also increases the export sunk costs (fxZ (Cx)/Z (C)). That is, the
indirect eﬀect of a lower transport cost, which works via the ex ante ﬁxed
costs of a proﬁtable product, increases as trade liberalization proceeds. How-
ever, Proposition 3 establishes that this negative eﬀect of a lower τ is always
dominated by the ﬁrst and second eﬀects combined.
Proposition 3 also shows that another aspect of trade liberalization, cap-
tured by a lower export cost fx, causes resource reallocation to innovative ac-
tivities. An intuitive account is similar to that of a lower transport cost. A key
diﬀerence, however, is that the direct eﬀect of fx works through F (C,Cx;fx),
i.e. the ex ante ﬁxed costs of a proﬁtable product.
Proposition 3 demonstrates that trade liberalization reallocates workers
from manufacturing to R&D, reducing employment in manufacturing. On the
other hand, Proposition 1 shows that workers are reallocated to exporting
ﬁrms from non-exporters within the manufacturing sector. These propositions
combined mean that freer trade releases workers from non-exporting ﬁrms
and makes them available to both of exporting ﬁrms and research ﬁrms that
conduct R&D.















which determines the rate of technical progress. Given Proposition 3, the next
result is straightforward:
Proposition 4. A lower transport cost τ or a lower export cost fx promotes
the rate of technical progress.
Proof. It is obvious from (43) and (45). ￿
This proposition conﬁrms that resources which are reallocated to R&D
due to trade liberalization unambiguously translate into an accelerated rate of
technical progress. (33) shows that technical progress depends on the threshold
level of marginal cost C as well as the number of R&D workers. An increase
in R&D workers tends to promote technical progress, but a lower threshold
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marginal cost C tends to decelerate it, since innovation becomes less likely
to be implemented. Although these eﬀects operate in opposite directions,
Proposition 4 conﬁrms that the positive eﬀect a lower transport cost that work
via R&D workers always outweighs the negative eﬀect through the threshold
marginal cost.
4.3 Welfare Eﬀects
This section considers the impact of trade liberalization on welfare. Welfare is
measured by consumer’s intertemporal utility, which depends on consumption














is the average quality level of intermediate goods across industries. It is also
equivalent to the world technological frontier deﬁned in (32). Since Q increases
over time due to technical progress, the price of ﬁnal output falls over time.
Given that expenditure E and the measure of type-A industries NA are both
constant in equilibrium, quality improvement increases consumption at the
rate of technical progress in the long run. In turn, this means that Propo-
sition 4 applies to consumption growth. This result again comes in stark
contrast with existing studies. Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud (2008) show that
consumption growth can rise or fall in the long run with trade liberalization.7
On the other hand, the numerator of (47) represents the average price
across industries. In type-A industries where products are exported, the price
of intermediate goods is cLλ. The same price is charged in a half of type-B
industries where the top-quality goods are produced by domestic monopoly
ﬁrms. In the other half of type-B industries, products are competitively pro-
duced at cL. Therefore, the geometric average of prices is given by cLλ
1+NA
2 .8
It shows that the average price rises, as the exporting industry expands. This
7In Gustafsson and Segerstrom (2007), consumption growth is pinned down by population
growth in the long run, because their model exhibits semi-endogenous growth (see Jones
(1995)).
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is the source of an adverse welfare eﬀect of trade liberalization in our model.
Now, plug (41) into (30) to derive the equilibrium level of consumption
expenditure:




In fact, it is equivalent to the representative consumer’s intertemporal budget
constraint in steady state. Consumption expenditure on the left-hand side is
equal to the sum of labor income L and interest income from equity investment
ρF (C,Cx)/2. Note that the total value of assets in the world is given by
F (C,Cx) in (31), and a half of it is owned by the representative consumer in
a country. In (31), the total asset is expressed in terms of costs associated
with R&D, implementation of innovation and export. The second term of
(31), f, captures the value of the threshold ﬁrm which is indiﬀerent between
implementing innovation and shutting down. The third term fxZ(Cx)/Z(C) is
the expected value of the threshold ﬁrm indiﬀerent between exporting and not
exporting. The ﬁrst term fr/Z(C), therefore, captures the combined “excess”
values of ﬁrms with 0 ≤ c < C over f in the domestic market and of ﬁrms
with 0 ≤ c < Cx over fx in the foreign market.
Noting g = (lnλ) ˙ Q/Q and using (47) and (49), the intertemporal utility
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The ﬁrst term on the right-hand side represents utility from the level of con-
sumption expenditure, and the second and third terms combined pick up the
eﬀect due to the price of ﬁnal output. The last term captures the eﬀect of
technical progress.9
Now, let us consider the eﬀect of a lower transport cost τ. We know
that both F (C,Cx) and g increase, i.e. the consumption expenditure and
the rate of technical progress rise with globalization. These two eﬀects tend to
increase welfare. On the other hand, trade liberalization increases the measure
of type-A industries, reducing the number of industries where products are
competitively produced. This has a negative impact on welfare.
9Strictly speaking, both the second and third terms come from the price of ﬁnal output.
The third term captures a continued fall in the price due to technical progress, and the
second term represents the “normalized” level of the price.
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Given the opposing eﬀects, there are two possibilities, which are illustrated
in Figure 3. Suppose that the transport cost τ is suﬃciently large. As τ drops,
welfare increases, since the positive eﬀects of higher consumption expenditure
and accelerated technical progress dominate the negative eﬀect of a higher
price level of ﬁnal output. As the transport cost increases further, two cases
can be distinguished. In the ﬁrst case, welfare continues to increase until τ = 1
is reached, as described by the thick curve in Figure 3. In the second case,
on the other hand, welfare starts declining after reaching the maximum before
τ = 1. This case is shown as a dotted curve in the ﬁgure.
Then, under what conditions do those diﬀerent cases arise? To answer this
question, we explore two cases. In the ﬁrst case, suppose that the export sunk
cost is zero, i.e. fx = 0. In this case, all products based on implementable
innovation are exported. This means that all industries are of type-A with
NA = 1. That is, all products are sold at monopoly price, and the price eﬀect
in (50) becomes independent of the transport cost. Therefore, in this case,
welfare monotonically increases as the transport cost falls. By continuity, the
next proposition follows.
Proposition 5. A lower transport cost monotonically increases welfare, if the
export sunk cost fx is suﬃciently small.
Entry into a foreign market involves diﬀerent costs. Costs that do not vary
with export volume (e.g. research on local regulatory environment and setting
up new distribution channels) are captured by the export sunk costs in our
model. On the other hand, per-unit costs (e.g. tariﬀs) are represented by
the transport cost. Proposition 5 shows that a fall in per-unit costs improves
welfare as long as costs independent of export volume are small enough.
In the second case, we exploit the fact that the threshold marginal costs
C and Cx are independent of the size of population L. This means that the
price eﬀect in (50) does not vary with the size of population. On the other
hand, the growth eﬀect is positively related to L. This is what is known as
scale eﬀects in the literature on R&D-based models. The larger the size of the
market, the greater the proﬁt incentive for R&D. Indeed, this property also
increases the marginal impact of a lower transport cost on welfare through the
growth eﬀect. The point can be understood by diﬀerentiating the third term
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This is positive, since the two derivatives on the right-hand side are negative
due to (43) and (45). More importantly, the magnitude of the derivative,
which captures the growth eﬀect of a lower transport cost, increases with the
size of population. Therefore, for a suﬃciently large L, the price eﬀect of a
lower transport cost (the second term in (50)) is outweighed by the other two
positive eﬀects.10 In this case, welfare monotonically increases as the transport
cost falls. This case corresponds to a thick curve in Figure 3. On the other
hand, if L is not suﬃciently large, then welfare is maximized before τ = 1.
This is the case where the price eﬀect is relatively large, corresponding to the
dotted curve in Figure 3.
A similar analysis can be conducted regarding the welfare eﬀect of a lower
export cost fx. Recalling Proposition 3, welfare monotonically increases with
a lower fx for a suﬃciently large L. Therefore, an essentially same result as
illustrated in Figure 3 applies to export costs fx. The discussion above is
summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 6. There are two possibilities regarding the normative eﬀect of
a lower transport cost τ or export cost fx:
1. welfare monotonically improves if L is suﬃciently large;
2. otherwise, welfare initially increases and then falls.
5 Introducing Population Growth
Proposition 6 implies that the larger the economy, the more likely that it ben-
eﬁts from trade liberalization. However, this result depends on scale eﬀects
in the sense that the rate of technical progress increases with the size of an
economy. This property, which is typical for the ﬁrst-generation R&D-based
models, is criticized by Jones (1995) as being inconsistent with data. Since
Jones’s criticism, several types of alternative R&D-based models are put for-
10A larger L lowers the expenditure eﬀect. But, as long as the growth eﬀect is suﬃciently
large, changes in welfare are positive.
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ward in an eﬀort to make them data-consistent.11 Following the literature, we
extend our basic model to introduce population growth to examine whether
our key results survive in an arguably more plausible setting.
We maintain all assumptions of the basic model, except the following.
Population grows at a rate of n > 0. Population is considered as a dynastic





where h is consumption per person. Interpreting E as expenditure per person,
the Euler condition (2) still holds. To remove scale eﬀects, we assume that
R&D becomes increasingly more diﬃcult, as the world technological frontier
advances. To capture this insight, we follow Segerstrom (1998) in assuming




, where ˙ Kt = κZ (C)ItKt, κ > 0, (53)
which replaces (11). K is the index of R&D diﬃculty, which captures the prop-
erty that R&D productivity tends to fall as more implementable innovations
are created. A parameter κ governs how fast R&D becomes more diﬃcult.
Given this assumption, free entry into R&D leads to
Vt = frKt, (54)
which replaces (13). Note that (53) means that R&D costs increase as the
technological frontier advances. Similarly, costs of implementing innovation
and entry into the foreign market are also assumed to increase, as the quality
level of products rises because of, e.g. increasing complexity of higher-quality
products. This is captured by assuming that costs of innovation implemen-
tation and foreign market entry are fK and fxK, respectively. Given these
assumptions, the threshold marginal costs C and Cx are determined by
vt (C) = fKt, vxt (Cx) = fxKt, (55)
which replace (9) and (10). Turning to the labor market condition, it is still
11Those studies include Young (1998), Segerstrom (1998) and Li (2000). See Jones (2005)
for a literature survey.
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given by (23). Remember that Z (C)I is equivalent to the number of industries
where implementable innovation occurs during a time interval dt. Therefore,
the total number of workers used to implement innovation is Z (C)I times fK,
which is fZ (C)R/fr. Workers required to export goods can also be calculated
in a similar manner.
Now, we are in a position to solve the model in steady state. It is easy to
conﬁrm that the new assumptions introduced above do not change equilibrium
conditions (35), (36) and (38) regarding the determination of the threshold
marginal costs, C and Cx. Therefore, the following result holds:
Proposition 7. Introducing population growth does not alter the properties of
the threshold marginal costs C and Cx in equilibrium, i.e. Propositions 1 and
2 are valid when population grows.









In steady state, labor allocation across diﬀerent sectors must be constant.
That is, the share of workers devoted to R&D, R/L, must be time-invariant.
In addition, the Poisson arrival rate of innovation (56) must be constant in
the long run. These properties together mean that the index of R&D diﬃculty
must grow at the rate of population growth, i.e. ˙ K/K = n. From this property








where the second equation uses (33). The ﬁrst equation says that the arrival
rate of implementable innovation is pinned down by population growth. The
second equation means that the rate of technical progress depends on nei-
ther the transport cost nor the export costs. Therefore, the rate of technical
progress is independent of trade liberalization. This is the same result as in
Gustafsson and Segerstrom (2007).
In this type of R&D-based models, the proportion of workers devoted to
R&D is endogenously determined. To calculate it, note that the values of the
threshold ﬁrms with C and Cx, which are deﬁned by (55), grow at the rate of
population growth. Taking this into account, the following condition can be




















This condition determines the share of workers used in R&D, taking the thresh-
old marginal costs C and Cx as given. Then, we can establish the following
result:
Proposition 8. A lower transport cost or export sunk cost unambiguously
increases the share of workers devoted to R&D in the total working population.
Proof. It is obvious from (43) and (45). ￿
Proposition 3 demonstrates that trade liberalization boosts R&D incen-
tives, and as a result, the economy reallocates more workers to innovative
activities. Proposition 8 shows that the result is robust even in the presence
of population growth without scale eﬀects.
Next, let us examine the impact of trade liberalization on welfare. To this
end, we use (23), (56), the ﬁrst equation of (57) and (58) to derive consumption
expenditure per person















where W (C,Cx;τ) is the value of assets held by each consumer. Given this and
following the calculation procedure in Appendix C, the intertemporal utility
function can be expressed as























Now, let us consider the eﬀect of a lower transport cost. It increases the
term called the expenditure eﬀect in (60) for the following reason. Consump-
tion expenditure depends on the value of assets held, which increases with the
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rate of monopoly markup Λ(·). Since a lower transport cost raises monopoly
markup through the direct and indirect channels identiﬁed above, consump-
tion expenditure increases. The terms which capture the price eﬀect in (60) is
the same as in the basic model. Due to this eﬀect, trade liberalization tends to
reduce welfare, as the number of competitive industries drops. On the other
hand, the growth eﬀect is independent of the transport cost and export cost,
given (57). Therefore, the expenditure and price eﬀects only determine how
welfare changes as trade becomes less restrictive. Since those two eﬀects op-
erate in opposite directions, there are still two possibilities, as illustrated in
Figure 3.
Then, under what conditions does welfare monotonically increase with a
lower transport cost? Again, we consider two cases. In the ﬁrst case, the
export sunk cost is taken to be zero. In this case, as before, the price eﬀect is
independent of the transport cost. Therefore, welfare monotonically increases
with a lower transport cost. By continuity, Proposition 5 holds in this extended
model.
In the second case, we exploit the fact that the threshold marginal costs
C and Cx are independent of a parameter κ, which captures the rate at which
R&D diﬃculty increases. This means that the price eﬀect is not aﬀected by
the parameter. On the other hand, the magnitude of the expenditure eﬀect




















It is easy to see that this marginal eﬀect is increasing in κ, given that the
derivatives on the left-hand side is negative due to (43). Therefore, a suf-
ﬁciently large κ can give rise to the situation where the expenditure eﬀect
dominates the price eﬀect as long as the price eﬀect is not too large (i.e. fx is
small).12 In summary;
Proposition 9. Regarding the welfare eﬀect of a lower transport cost τ, it is
ambiguous in general. However,
1. welfare can monotonically increase if κ is suﬃciently large and the price
12In (61), there is an upper limit on the derivative, as κ goes to inﬁnity. In this sense, the
expenditure eﬀect can dominate the price eﬀect if the latter is not too large.
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eﬀect is not too large;
2. otherwise, welfare initially increases and then falls.
The intuition for this result goes as follows. A higher κ means a lower
Poisson arrival rate of implementable innovation in the steady state (see (57)).
This tends to raise the value of ﬁrms, hence that of assets held by consumers.
Because of this, the expenditure eﬀect of a lower transport cost becomes so
large that it can dominate the price eﬀect.
Some comments are in order. First, the channel through which a higher
κ magniﬁes the expenditure eﬀect is the value of assets held. On the other
hand, in the basic model with scale eﬀects, a monotonically increasing welfare
due to trade liberalization arises for a suﬃciently large market size (L). In
this case, a greater L increases labor income, leading to a higher consumption
expenditure. Therefore, the two parameters aﬀect two diﬀerent sources of
income.
Second, the R&D productivity of a given ﬁrm is aﬀected unintentionally by
other ﬁrms’ investment in R&D in the present as well in the past. In this sense,
the parameter κ, which governs how fast R&D diﬃculty increases, captures a
negative externality in R&D. Using this interpretation, Proposition 9 means
that the larger the negative externality in R&D, the more likely that welfare
monotonically increases as trade becomes less restrictive. Indeed, Gustafsson
and Segerstrom (2007) reports a similar result. In their model, consumers be-
come better-oﬀ in the long run if what they call the knowledge spillover eﬀect
is small enough. The knowledge spillover eﬀect in their model combines (i) the
“standing on shoulders eﬀect” in the sense that R&D productivity improves
with the stock of knowledge created in the past, and (ii) the “stepping on
toes” eﬀect of R&D which reduces R&D productivity due to duplication. In
Gustafsson and Segerstrom (2007), if the second negative eﬀect is dominant,
welfare monotonically increases with trade liberalization. In this sense, Propo-
sition 9 is consistent with their result. Note that Gustafsson and Segerstrom
(2007) argue that the negative eﬀect is likely to be dominant on the basis of
empirical data, including a falling trend of patents per researcher.
6 Discussion
Propositions 3, 4 and 8 sharply contrast with the results reported in Baldwin
and Robert-Nicoud (2008) and Gustafsson and Segerstrom (2007). In the ﬁrst
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paper, R&D workers as well as growth of variety expansion can rise or fall
due to trade liberalization. In the second paper with population growth, trade
liberalization has no eﬀect on the share of workers devoted to R&D in total
population and causes a temporary slowdown in variety growth in the short
run. Why does the present model generate contrasting results?
The key diﬀerence between our model and the above-mentioned studies lies
in the type of technical progress. Because of this, diﬀerent types of production
functions are assumed. In our model of quality improvement, the production
function (3) is of a Cobb-Douglas type. On the other hand, CES production
functions are used in Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud (2008) and Gustafsson and
Segerstrom (2007), who follow the variety-based approach of Melitz (2003).
This diﬀerence is crucial in understanding contrasting results.
To be more speciﬁc, note that in our model, there are two channels through
which the transport cost aﬀects the number of R&D workers employed in
equilibrium; (1) aggregate proﬁts, and (2) the ex ante ﬁxed costs of developing
a proﬁtable product. Let us explain those channels in turn.




where ˜ E = E in the basic model and ˜ E = EL in the model extended with
population growth. The transport cost aﬀects the rate of monopoly markup
or Λ(C,Cx;τ) directly and indirectly through the threshold marginal costs C
and Cx. Remember that Λ(C,Cx;τ) unambiguously increases through these
channels as the transport cost drops (see (43)).
Note that the aggregate proﬁts are linearly related to the ex ante expected
value of innovation (see (25)). This means that the transport cost aﬀects aggre-
gate proﬁts, hence the value of innovation. Through this R&D incentive eﬀect,
a lower transport cost induces R&D ﬁrms to employ more workers. Next, note
that the labor demand in manufacturing is negatively related to aggregate
proﬁts, as (29) shows. That is, changes in the transport cost cause labor real-
location between manufacturing and R&D. Through this general equilibrium
eﬀect, a lower transport cost reduces labor demand in manufacturing, mak-
ing more workers available to R&D. On the other hand, in the variety-based
models of Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud (2008) and Gustafsson and Segerstrom
(2007), aggregate proﬁts are independent of the transport cost in equilibrium,
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because of the CES production functions assumed.13 That is, changes in the
transport cost neither aﬀect the R&D incentives nor cause the general equilib-
rium eﬀect through aggregate proﬁts in the long run. Indeed, because of this
property, the share of workers devoted to R&D becomes independent of the
transport cost in Gustafsson and Segerstrom (2007).
Next, let us turn to the ex ante ﬁxed costs of developing a proﬁtable prod-
ucts. This channel is captured by F (C,Cx;fx) in our model. Note that it
increases with a lower transport cost or export cost. Put diﬀerently, trade
liberalization raises the ex ante ﬁxed costs. Because of this eﬀect, R&D incen-
tives are negatively aﬀected, and less workers are made available to R&D in
the labor market. In our model, however, this negative eﬀect is always dom-
inated by the eﬀects that operate through aggregate proﬁts. In Baldwin and
Robert-Nicoud (2008), in contrast, the ex ante sunk cost is the only channel
that operates in response to trade liberalization. In their model, the ex ante
ﬁxed costs can rise or fall, depending on the structure of knowledge assumed.
Hence, trade liberalization can be pro- or anti-growth in the long run.
Two questions still remain to be answered. Li (2001) develops a quality-
ladder model with the assumption of the CES production function. The model
is also extended to include population growth in Li (2000). Those two models
essentially come in between the present model on one hand and Baldwin and
Robert-Nicoud (2008) and Gustafsson and Segerstrom (2007) on the other.
Then, the ﬁrst question is “How do our key results change if the present
model is developed in the framework of the CES production function?” The
issue is explored in Haruyama and Kol´ eda (2008).
Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud (2008) shows that the impact of trade lib-
eralization on growth depends upon the structure of knowledge. This result
partly owes to the property of variety-based models which require knowledge
to be expressed in explicit forms. Then, the second question is “Are our key
results sensitive to the knowledge structure assumed?” In the present model,
knowledge is implicitly incorporated in the quality index λk.14 In this sense,
modelling knowledge is limited in our model. However, a quality-ladder model
with the CES production function allows one to assume diﬀerent forms of
13See equations (6) and (10) of Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud (2008), and equations (11),
(16) and (23) of Gustafsson and Segerstrom (2007).
14Note that if successful in R&D, ﬁrms can leapfrog the incumbent ﬁrm in the quality
level without re-inventing lower quality products. This captures the intertemporal spillover
of knowledge.
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knowledge. Research on the issue is tackled in Haruyama and Kol´ eda (2008).
7 Further Analysis
7.1 Endogenizing Ex Ante Heterogeneity
In existing trade models of heterogeneous ﬁrms, the distribution of ﬁrm het-
erogeneity is determined based on sunk costs, taking the ex ante distribution
of ﬁrm productivity as given. The purpose of this section is to demonstrate
that the ex ante distribution of ﬁrm heterogeneity can be endogenized in our
framework. Another objective is to explore the issue of whether or not beneﬁts
of trade liberalization come from changes in the ex ante distribution of ﬁrm
productivity.
We assume that marginal costs are drawn from the following Pareto density
function:
z (c;fr) =  
cµ−1
cH (fr)
µ, c ∈ (0,cH (fr)),
0 < cH (fr) < ∞, c′
H (fr) < 0,   > 1,
(63)
which replaces (6). The derivative implies that a higher probability of lower
marginal costs is realized if a higher fr is chosen. This introduces a trade-oﬀ











[v (c) − f]z (c;fr)dc +
Z Cx
0
[vx (c) − fx]z (c;fr)dc (65)
is the ex ante value of innovation, which is now increasing in fr. The number
of R&D workers is still determined by the free entry condition (13). Regarding
the choice of fr, research ﬁrms face a trade-oﬀ between a greater ex ante value
of innovation and a lower probability of R&D success. Appendix D shows that
the ﬁrst-order condition can be rearranged into
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The second-order condition is satisﬁed when η′ (δ) < 0 where δ ≡ 1/fr, which
is assumed. Given R&D productivity fr chosen by ﬁrms, the ex ante distri-
bution of manufacturing productivity is determined. Note that fr in (66) is
determined, independent of other endogenous variables. Therefore, the follow-
ing result is obvious.
Proposition 10. Suppose that the density function of marginal costs is given
by the Pareto distribution (63). Then, τ, fx and R&D subsidies do not aﬀect
R&D productivity and the ex ante distribution of marginal costs.
Note that the Pareto distribution is often found to be a plausible approx-
imation of the distribution of manufacturing productivity in many empirical
studies. The present model predicts that trade liberalization has no impact
on the ex ante distribution of ﬁrm productivity. This means that an increase
in manufacturing productivity due to freer trade comes mainly from changes
in the ex post distribution of productivity.
7.2 R&D Subsidy
In the literature on endogenous technical progress, it is well known that sub-
sidies to R&D increase the number of R&D workers employed and promote
technical progress, as costs of innovative activities are reduced. The policy is
often analyzed as a means to restore Pareto eﬃciency, which is not achieved
in R&D-based models where external eﬀects are the driving force of long-run
growth. In this section, we re-examine whether or not R&D subsidies are still
useful in boosting R&D incentives. We are also interested in the issue of how
the industrial policy aﬀects the distribution of manufacturing productivity of
ﬁrms, which beneﬁt from R&D subsidies.
Equilibrium conditions (36) and (38), which determine threshold marginal
costs C and Cx, are now given by
(1 − s)fr = D(C;τ,fx), (1 − s)fr = X (Cx;τ,fx). (67)
They are still depicted in Figure 2. As the rate of R&D subsidy increases, the
horizontal line in the ﬁgure shifts downward. It should be obvious that both
threshold marginal costs C and Cx fall in response. The intuition is simple.
The subsidy reduces the cost of R&D, inducing more workers to be employed
in innovative activity. In turn, this leads to a fall in the ex ante value of
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innovation. Such a change is realized partly by a fall in C (as it makes it less
likely that innovation is implemented), and partly by a fall in Cx (as it makes
it more diﬃcult for products to be exported).
There are two implications of this result. First, the number of exporting
industries, measured by NA, ambiguously changes. In this sense, R&D subsi-
dies are not necessarily trade-promoting. Second, a fall in C means that the
average productivity of operating ﬁrms rises (see (40)). That is, the subsidy
reinforces the productivity-improving eﬀect of globalization.





















It is reduced to (46) when s = 0, as F (C,Cx) = ˜ F (C,Cx). The direct eﬀect of
the policy works via the term ˜ F (C,Cx;s). It is easy to show that g is falling in
˜ F (C,Cx;s), which means that g is increasing in s through this direct channel.
However, as discussed above, R&D subsidies also aﬀect threshold marginal
costs C and Cx, which indirectly impact on technical progress. Since both of
them fall in response to the policy, the indirect eﬀect is ambiguous in general.
One reason is that through the indirect channel, the expected rate of monopoly
markup drops, while the ex post ﬁxed costs of developing a proﬁtable product
changes ambiguously. As a result, the rate of technical progress changes am-
biguously in response to R&D subsidies. The same conclusion can be drawn
regarding the number of R&D workers, given (33). In summary,
Proposition 11. As R&D subsidies are applied,
1. the threshold marginal costs C and Cx fall
2. the number of R&D workers and the rate of technical progress change
ambiguously in general.
The implication of Result 2 of this proposition is that a clear-cut result
regarding the growth eﬀect of R&D subsidies in existing R&D-based does not
necessarily hold in the presence of heterogeneous ﬁrms. It also means that
R&D subsidies may not be enough to restore social optimum when the market
fails due to externalities associated with knowledge creation.
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8 Concluding Remarks
The present paper is the ﬁrst attempt in the literature to introduce the con-
tinual improvement of product quality into an international trade model with
heterogeneous ﬁrms. Our modelling approach departs from most of the ex-
isting studies which are founded on the variety-based model of Melitz (2003).
One advantage of our quality-ladder model over variety-based models is that
the exit of ﬁrms from the market is endogenously determined due to the pro-
cess of creative destruction.
Using our framework, several interesting results are established. First,
trade liberalization, captured by a lower transport cost or export sunk cost,
drives less ineﬃcient ﬁrms out of the market and reallocates resources to ex-
porting industries from non-exporting ones. That is, less restrictive trade
improves the level of manufacturing productivity, expanding the exporting
sector. This widely accepted result is shown to hold even if continual quality
enhancement drives grow with and without population growth.
Second, trade liberalization is found to promote long-run growth. Freer
trade increases proﬁt incentives for innovative activities, and consequently,
the employment of R&D workers expands. This translates into a higher rate
of technical progress and consumption growth. Robustness of this key result is
checked in an extended model with population growth. Trade liberalization is
shown to increase the proportion of R&D workers in total population. These
results, together with the ﬁrst result, mean that resources are reallocated to
R&D and exporting industries from non-exporting industries. These pro-R&D
results come in stark contrast with existing studies which essentially show the
opposite. In addition, we also establish that welfare unambiguously improves
under certain conditions.
Third, we endogenize the ex ante distribution of ﬁrm heterogeneity, which
is assumed to be exogenous in existing studies. Our result shows that an
increase in manufacturing productivity due to trade liberalization is realized
through the ex post rather than ex ante distribution of ﬁrm heterogeneity. In
this sense, the assumption of an exogenous ex ante distribution in existing
studies is justiﬁed. As part of an extended analysis, we also consider the eﬀect
of R&D subsidies, which is often discussed in the literature on endogenous
technical progress. This industrial policy is found to induce less eﬃcient ﬁrms
to exit from both the domestic and foreign markets. In this sense, the policy
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boosts the level of manufacturing productivity, though it does not necessarily
promote export. On the other hand, it is not clear whether or not subsidizing
R&D promotes technical progress.
We believe that these results represent an important improvement in the
understanding of the eﬀects of trade liberalization on the level as well as growth
rate of ﬁrm productivity.
Appendix A
This appendix derives (29). In the intermediate goods sector, the total number
































































































































































































































































The last line is equivalent to (27).
Appendix B
This appendix shows that utility growth of the representative consumer in





B as a measure of industries where (i) the state-of-the-art products
are exported, (ii) the top-quality goods are imported, (iii) the top-quality
products are domestically produced by a monopoly, but not exported, and
(iv) the second-highest quality products are competitively produced, and not






Using these deﬁnitions, Figure 4 shows the directions of a movement of in-
dustries as innovation occurs. Each term attached to the arrows indicates the



















lnλkidi, m = A,B, b = X,IM,M,C
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is the average of lnλk in each measure of industries. Given Nb
m, m = A,B,














m is the average change in lnλk in each type of industries. To rewrite
˙ Qb
m, note that the quality level of products λki increases as innovation moves
industries along the arrows in Figure 4. Especially, three cases can be dis-
tinguished; (i) thick arrows show the case where the quality level of products
rises by λ, (ii) thick dotted arrows indicate the case where the quality level
increases by λ2, and (iii) thin dotted arrows correspond to the case where the




































where φ’s are the Poisson arrival rates of innovation, given that innovation is
implementable and, if relevant, goods are exported. Those arrival rates are
given by
φX
A (I,C,Cx) =Z (Cx)I + Z (Cx)I∗ + [Z (C) − Z (Cx)]I,
φIM
A (I,C,Cx) =Z (Cx)I + Z (Cx)I∗ + [Z (C) − Z (Cx)]I∗,
φM
B (I,C,Cx) =Z (Cx)I + Z (Cx)I∗ + [Z (C) − Z (Cx)]I,
φC
B (I,C,Cx) =[Z (C) − Z (Cx)]I∗,
ˆ φC
B (I,C,Cx) =Z (Cx)I + Z (Cx)I∗ + [Z (C) − Z (Cx)]I
where asterisks indicate foreign variables. Therefore,
˙ QX
A = ˙ QIM
A = ˙ QM
B = (lnλ)[Z (C) + Z (Cx)]I, (B3)
˙ QC
B = (lnλ)[3Z (C) + Z (Cx)]I, (B4)
using I = I∗. Noting NX
A = NIM
A = NA/2 and NM
B = NC
B = NB/2 and
substituting (B3) and (B4) into (B2), we can derive (32).
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Appendix C
C.1 Price of Final Output
Using the production function (3) and the demand function (4), one can derive











































taking into account that some industries are competitive and others are monopoly.
C.2 Intertemporal Utility Function
Remembering Y = E/P, substitute (C1) and (49) into the intertemporal














which can be reduced to (50).
Appendix D








= − η (δ) < 0 (D1)
where zδ ≡
z(c;δ)
dδ and η (δ) ≡ δ
cH
dcH
dδ . Note that this elasticity is independent of
c, given (63). (64) is equivalent to maxR,δ V (δ)δR−(1 − s)R. Diﬀerentiating










[vx (c) − fx][z (c;δ) + δzδ (c;δ)]dc.
(D2)
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Therefore, the F.O.C. is
0 = [1 −  η (δ)]
￿Z C
cL
[v (c) − f]z (c;δ)dc +
Z Cx
cL
[vx (c) − fx]z (c;δ)dc
￿
or
1 =  η (δ) ⇒ 1 = − η (fr)




























From (63), we have




zδδ (c;δ) =2 η (δ)
z (c;δ)












which is negative if and only if η′ (δ) < 0.
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Figure 1: Continual changes in types of industries due to innovation.
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Figure 3: Welfare eﬀects of a lower transport cost.




















Figure 4: In the ﬁgure, the arrows indicate the directions of industry dynamics
due to innovation. Interpretations of the arrows are as follows: (i) thick arrows
shows the cases where the quality level rises by λ, (ii) thick dotted arrows
indicate the cases where the quality level increases by λ2, and (iii) thin dotted
arrows correspond to the cases where the quality level does not change. In
addition, (1)-(3) indicate the Poisson arrival rates of innovation along their
associated arrows, and they are deﬁned as follows: (1) Z(Cx)I, (2) Z(Cx)I∗,
(3) [Z(C) − Z(Cx)]I where asterisks indicate a foreign variable.
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